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ABSTRACT 
The airborne concept has had a lasting impact on military force structures since its 
employment on a large scale during World War II. It is puzzling to consider how little 
airborne organizational structures and employment concepts have changed in the 
intervening seven decades, considering the great amount of change occurring in warfare. 
This thesis examines the future potential of airborne concepts by rethinking traditional 
airborne organizational structures and employment concepts. Using a holistic approach in 
the areas of organization, doctrine, technology, and strategy as guiding frames of 
reference, this thesis recommends updating the organizational structures of airborne 
forces to model a “small and many” approach over a “large and few” approach, while 
incorporating a “swarming” concept. Utilizing historical and contemporary vignettes to 
demonstrate airborne utility, this research reveals how a parachute capability displays the 
unique attributes to complement a swarming concept. Under an updated organizational 
structure and new employment concept, airborne forces can offer renewed relevancy to 
the U.S. Department of Defense against modern adversaries in crises and conflict. 
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In September 1944, over 20,000 Allied airborne troops were utilized in the 
Netherlands as part of Operation Market Garden.1 The sky would have been thick with 
parachutes as two entire U.S. Army divisions—the 82nd and 101st—were dropped 
behind German lines, along with equipment and an additional 15,000 glider troops.2 This 
combined arms operation resulted in heavy losses for the Allies, particularly the airborne 
forces, which were prevented from linking up with the relief columns as planned. It is 
difficult to conceive of another such spectacle on today’s battlefields: the sun literally 
blotted out by thousands of U.S. paratroopers drifting slowly into harm’s way. Yet, U.S. 
airborne forces’ structure has remained largely unchanged since World War II, 70 years 
ago. The 82nd and the 101st remain two of only eight active duty infantry divisions, and 
such mass drops still regularly assault the fields of Forts Campbell and Bragg.3  
It is puzzling, therefore, to consider how airborne force structure has endured into 
the current operating environment, given the reduction of U.S. military forces, the 
proliferation of new area-denial technologies, and the outdating of traditional strategies 
used to infiltrate territory. How is it that the organizational structure of an airborne unit 
and the employment concept have remained the same, despite the monumental changes to 
the types of conflicts the United States confronts? The airborne division continues to be 
the U.S. Department of Defense’s (DOD) structural formula for airborne force 
organization along with a traditionalist view of “few and large” over “many and small.”4 
This formula needs to be reconsidered. It is time for a fresh perspective on airborne 
                                                 
1 John C. Warren, Airborne Operations in WWII European Theater, USAF Historical Studies, no. 97 
(September 1956): 226–227, http://www.afhra.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-090602-016.pdf. Some 
28,000 troops dropped on D-Day and shortly thereafter. 
2 Ibid. 
3 The 101st restructured to an air assault division; however, some specialty units still stay proficient in 
airborne operations at Fort Campbell. 
4 John Arquilla, “The New Rules of War,” Foreign Policy, February 11, 2010, http://foreignpolicy. 
com/2010/02/11/the-new-rules-of-war/. Dr. Arquilla argues that the military needs a new mindset for 
combating modern warfare with an organizational structure of “many and small” over “few and large.” 
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organization and new employment concepts to optimize current capabilities, force 
structure, and future employment.  
The organization and employment of all military forces is rooted in government 
strategies set forth by decision makers. The National Security Strategy (NSS) serves as 
the United States’ guiding security document. The NSS places special emphasis on 
preserving the military’s ability to access the globe and defeat anti-access capabilities that 
would restrict power projection.5 Trickling down from national policy, the DOD provides 
the military instrument of policy for maintaining access by declaring “operational access” 
as a critical strategic imperative.6 Military access can be achieved through a multitude of 
sea, air, land, space, and cyber means;7 however, the parachute capability of an airborne 
force offers a unique entry method used to gain access to an area of operation in 
contested and permissive land environments. The airborne option continues to be the 
DOD’s premier forced-entry technique to gain access when a threat is complex and 
uncertain, and yet it needs to be updated to instantiate the capabilities effectively called 
for by national strategy.8 The following section discusses the ODTS (organization, 
doctrine, technology, and strategy) methodology in the thesis. 
A. ODTS METHODOLOGY 
The organizational structure of military forces does not simply exist for its own 
sake, but rather serves, ideally, to optimally achieve the military objectives desired by the 
force employers and decision makers. As such, the structure of military forces requires a 
careful consideration of not only organization, but also a well-informed understanding of 
strategy, doctrine, and technology. For example, the rise of the German panzer divisions 
                                                 
5 White House, National Security Strategy (NSS) (Washington, DC: White House, 2010), 14. Of 
particular note, the Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC), January 17, 2012, ii, declares the essential 
access challenge for future joint forces is to be able to “project military force into an operational area” and 
“sustain it in the face of armed opposition.” 
6 Department of Defense, Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) (Washington, DC: Department of 
Defense, 2012); Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) (Washington, DC: Department 
of Defense, 2014). 
7 Department of Defense, Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC), 1. 
8 Charles Flynn and Josua Richardson, “Joint Operational Access and the Global Response Force,” 
Military Review, July–August 2013. 
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in the 1930s required a holistic understanding of all areas in strategy, doctrine, and 
technology to justify that organizational change.9 Heinz Wilhelm Guderian could not 
have made an attractive case for reorganizing the armored tank forces into a relative few 
divisions without an accurate technological frame of reference that displayed 
understanding in improved attack aircraft, mobile artillery, tank mobility, and advances in 
the radio. From a doctrinal point of view, the panzer division could only be successful if 
used for decisive penetration maneuvers and not for the protracted attritional battles of 
World War I. In a strategic context, these changes enabled visions of quick and decisive 
campaigns, which meant the Germans could achieve victory with fewer forces employed 
by re-organizing their armor into panzer divisions. As this example illustrates, 
organization, doctrine, technology, and strategy are closely linked and reliant upon each 
other; understanding these concepts allowed the Germans to make well-informed 
organizational changes to optimize their fighting force. For this reason, the authors’ 
method considers each of these areas.10  
Based on the research conducted in this thesis, the authors have derived the 
following recommendations. A new swarming strategy should be considered for airborne 
forces incorporating many dispersed, internetted maneuver units. These units must be 
capable of mixing and matching, conducting standoff operations and obtaining close-in 
capabilities, while having integrated surveillance, sensors, and command, control 
communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) for 
“topsight.” This new employment concept must be linked with organizational redesign 
for airborne forces incorporating a “small and many” over a “large and few” concept. The 
DOD should increase investment in small-scale airborne forces while large-scale airborne 
units must downsize from division and brigade units to battalion and smaller. This 
organization and doctrine will espouse the current technology environment with small-
scale airborne units continuing to implement advanced technology in parachute systems, 
transport aircraft, navigation aids, and stealth enhancements. Large-scale units will 
                                                 
9 Kenneth Macksey, Guderian: Panzer General-revised EDITION (South Yorkshire, England: 
Greenhill Books, 2003), 1–20. 
10 Dr. John Arquilla provided the guidance and information on the Guderian methodology example for 
the link between strategy, doctrine, organization, and technology. 
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change their current doctrine to heavy armored capabilities that combat the modern anti-
access/area-denial (A2AD) threat employed by U.S. adversaries. Finally, U.S. policy 
makers and senior leaders must be willing to accept change and risk in the current 
security environment. A reorganized airborne force and new employment concept for 
both small and large units are necessary for today’s U.S. airborne forces.  
B. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
Using strategy, doctrine, and technology as guiding influences for organizing the 
modern airborne force, this project identifies the pertinent components of each for the 
DOD to make an informed consideration of future airborne organization. Instead of 
making a narrow judgment on the tactical utility of airborne operations for the DOD, it 
holistically addresses the ways airborne forces have been, are, or could be organized for 
modern and future operations. This review is accomplished in four sections that address 
organization and doctrine, technology, strategy, and recommendations. These sections 
proceed as follows.  
First, the issues of organization and doctrine are addressed. This section 
categorizes the taxonomy of airborne units to include both small and large-scale forces. 
The contemporary operating environment suggests that small wars and conflicts 
occurring in hybrid form are increasingly more common. The small-scale, Special Forces 
(SOF) airborne roles display greater relevancy in this trend for their speed, precision, and 
stealth capabilities. Yet, the expansion and proliferation of A2AD systems offer renewed 
possibilities for conventional, large-scale airborne employment. Recognizing that the 
large-scale airborne roles are much less likely to recur, an increased investment in small-
scale airborne capability is recommended.  
The next section links technology and force structures and delineates the broad 
and narrow technology frames of reference to provide context to the reader on the 
broader implications of technology trends and the specific changes occurring within 
airborne technology. For airborne concepts, it means greater mobility is granted to 
smaller formations and larger formations are imperiled.  
 5 
The third section of the body discusses the incorporation of airborne operations 
into a swarming concept. Swarming characteristics incorporate autonomous, integrated, 
coordinated, and dispersed small-units designed to operate in standoff or close-in 
distances while sustainably pulsing with force or fire. This section applies the re-
organized airborne force structure and doctrine with a proposed swarming strategy. 
The concluding section offers the necessary tools to implement the new 
employment concept. Areas of future research are offered to advance this concept by 
using SOF as a test bed for the swarming concept. Further attention should be allotted to 
the DOD force structure design, doctrinal rewrites, and swarming applications with U.S. 
parachute forces. 
 6 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 7 
II. IDENTIFYING THE ROLES OF AIRBORNE FORCES: 
ORGANIZATION AND DOCTRINE 
Airborne forces continue to enjoy a prominence in U.S. force structure. Nearly 
three quarters of a century later, most historians would consider Airborne’s greatest 
utility to have occurred during World War II with the division-sized drops that were 
undertaken across the European theater. It is noteworthy and somewhat puzzling that the 
organizational structure of an airborne unit of action has remained largely intact since its 
inception. The airborne division continues to be the U.S. DOD’s structural formula for 
airborne force organization. It adds to the growing debate on force structure and 
organization within all the DOD for optimizing the modern force. Many traditionalists 
long to maintain the larger force structures, while progressive thinkers seek to replace the 
“few and large” with the “many and small.”11 While attempts to scale down the U.S. 
Army’s unit of action resulted in the creation of the brigade combat teams (BCT), the 
airborne division maintains ultimate authority. Yet, utility in airborne extends far beyond 
the capabilities of the airborne division.  
The aim of this chapter is to redefine the role of airborne forces to relate the 
employment of airborne forces to the growing debates on military force structure and the 
concept of swarming in modern operations. First, the taxonomy of airborne forces is 
addressed to include both the conventional and SOF. Second, airborne operational roles, 
to include those involving both small- and large-scale forces, with historical vignettes are 
critically examined. Third, the current operating environment is discussed, to include the 
threats generated by both state and non-state actors. In conclusion, this chapter 
summarizes the roles of small and large-scale airborne utility and the contributions to the 
new operational concept of swarming. 
                                                 
11 Arquilla, “The New Rules of War.” Dr. Arquilla argues that the military needs a new perspective for 
combating modern warfare with an organizational structure of “many and small” over “few and large.”  
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A. TAXONOMY OF AIRBORNE ROLES 
Small-scale airborne forces are organized under SOF and large-scale airborne 
forces come under conventional forces. For this analysis, small-scale airborne forces are 
defined as any element smaller than a battalion. Small-scale airborne forces typically 
utilize high-performance parachutes in military free-fall operations with the latest in 
training and equipment fielding. These units operate independently in austere 
environments with a decentralized chain of command, offering a low signature for 
specialty-type operations. For this analysis, large-scale airborne forces are defined as a 
battalion element and larger. Large-scale operations utilize static-line operations with 
non-steerable parachutes to seize terrain. The units are capable of deploying up to a 
division-sized element with a large amount of coordination and logistics. The following 
sections define each camp (conventional and SOF) to further develop the argument about 
small- or large-scale airborne operations. 
1. Conventional Airborne Forces 
The U.S. Army maintains a conventional airborne capability with one active 
division in Fort Bragg, North Carolina and three active brigades: one in Italy, one in 
Alaska, and one in Hawaii. The mission of these conventional airborne units is to 
“strategically deploy, conduct forcible entry parachute assault and secure key objectives 
for follow-on military operations in support of U.S. national interests.”12 Additionally, 
three ranger battalions and one ranger special troops battalion (RSTB) conduct airfield 
seizure operations as one of their legacy tasks. The roles associated with maintaining an 
                                                 
12 The 82nd Airborne Division has three Airborne Brigade combat teams (1st, 2nd, and 3rd BCT) 
located at Fort Bragg), North Carolina. The division also has a headquarters and headquarters battalion, 
combat aviation brigade, and division artillery. “Welcome to the Home of America’s Guard of Honor,” 
accessed April 1, 2015, http://www.bragg.army.mil/82nd/Pages/default.aspx. The 173rd Airborne Brigade 
consists of the 1/503rd and 2/503rd infantry battalions, a brigade special troops battalion, a cavalry 
squadron, a field artillery battalion and a support battalion, located in Vicenza, Italy). “SkySoldiers,” 
accessed April 1, 2015, http://www.eur.army.mil/173abct/. The 4th Brigade 25th Infantry ID consists of 
four airborne battalions located in Hawaii. The 25th infantry division also has one airborne brigade located 
in Alaska. “4th Brigade Combat Team (Airborne),” accessed April 2015, http://www.usarak.army.mil/4bde 
25th/.  
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airborne capability for these units are for seizing, shows of force, and reinforcing 
operations.13  
2. Special Operations Forces  
The U.S. Army maintains a SOF airborne capability that extends throughout five 
active Special Forces (SF) groups, two active civil affairs (CA) brigades and two active 
psychological operations (PSYOPS) groups.14 Additionally, a number of Air Force, 
Marine and Naval Special Operations maintain special purpose airborne forces. The 
United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) mission is “to provide trained, 
equipped, ready, and regionally aligned Special Operations Forces (SOF) in support of 
Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs), and through unified action, conduct 
sustained special operations to eliminate threats to U.S. interests and protect the 
American people.”15 The roles associated with maintaining an airborne capability for 
these units are for raids, reconnaissance, and special warfare missions.  
3. Roles for Airborne Forces  
A variety of roles for U.S. airborne forces are accepted within the DOD. These 
roles are specified in U.S. doctrine, joint doctrine, and rooted in national policy.16 These 
sources offer vague guidance for airborne forces with an unclear distinction of roles. 
Based on these various sources, Figure 1 offers three clearly defined roles for the 
                                                 
13 The authors consolidated the major airborne roles from FM 90–26 Airborne Operations and 
identified the most important roles for small- and large-scale airborne forces. Headquarters, Airborne 
Operations: Field Manual 90=26, 1–5. 
14 The 1st Special Forces Regiment has five active Special Forces Groups (1st, 3rd, 5th, 7th, 10th 
SFG(A)) and two National Guard Groups (19th and 20th Group). “The United States Army Special 
Operations Command,” accessed April 1, 2015, http://www.soc.mil. The 75th Ranger Regiment has three 
Ranger Battalions and a Ranger Training Support Battalion (RTSB). The Navy has SEAL teams located on 
the East and West Coast and the Marines have the Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC) with 
specialized airborne units in each command. “The United States Army Special Operations Command.” 
15 William H. McRaven, 2014 USSOCOM Posture Statement Before the Senate Armed Services 
Committee Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee, 113th Cong., 1 (2013) (statement of Admiral 
William J. McRaven, USN, Commander, United States Special Operations Command). 
16 Headquarters, Airborne Operations: Field Manual 90=26 (Washington, DC: Department of the 
Army, 1990); Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Forcible Entry Operations JP 3=18 (Washington, DC: Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, 2012), 1–5; The National Security Strategy (NSS), Quadrennial Defense Review, and Joint 
Operational Access Concept (JOAC) discuss the importance of operational access for strategic utility. 
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implementation of both small- and large-scale airborne forces. The three roles for small-
scale airborne assaults are for their use in reconnaissance, raiding, and special warfare. 
The three roles for large-scale airborne assaults are seizures, shows of force and 
reinforcement. These roles are explained in further detail in the following sections. 
 
Figure 1.  Small- and Large-scale Airborne Roles17 
B. THE UTILITY OF SMALL-SCALE AIRBORNE FORCES 
Small-scale airborne forces are advantageous for gaining operational access by 
using stealth, standoff, speed, and precision. Historical and contemporary evidence 
reinforces the utility of small-scale airborne operations in modern warfare. U.S. doctrine 
describes the capabilities of small-scale airborne operations to include “providing 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities and may conduct direct action 
operations.”18 Figure 2 illustrates the primary roles for small-scale airborne utilization 
and key attributes for each role. This section argues the value of maintaining small 




                                                 
17 The authors consolidated the major airborne roles from FM 90-26 Airborne Operations and 
identified the most important roles for small and large-scale airborne forces. Headquarters, Airborne 
Operations: Field Manual 90-26, 1–5. 
18 Headquarters, Airborne Operations: Field Manual 90-26, 1–5. 
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Figure 2.  Small-scale Utilization of Airborne Forces 
1. Reconnaissance 
Reconnaissance is a primary mission for small-scale units because it provides a 
stealthy and expeditious means of gathering intelligence and in forming the planning 
considerations of military commanders.19 Recon is conducted in one of two ways. First, 
as part of the military planning process, prior to the mission; or second, as the primary 
mission itself. An example of the former includes recon on a target prior to calling in air 
strikes. An example of the latter is recon for intelligence purposes. Conducting airborne 
as an infiltration platform for recon provides the planner improved operational access for 
deep infiltration, unreachable terrain, low signature, and in a contested environment. 
Recon has been used in airborne operations since its inception and has many historical 
case studies that highlight its importance.  
During the Vietnam War, the Military Assistance Command-Vietnam Studies and 
Observations Group (MACVSOG) trained and assisted commandos for special warfare 
and reconnaissance missions into North Vietnam. Airborne infiltration was a critical 
capability for this special force of 4-to-6-man teams. Displaying great airborne utility in 
these stealthy operations, the MACVSOG conducted covert operations with U.S. SF, 
                                                 
19 Joint Publication 2-0 defines reconnaissance as a mission undertaken to obtain, by visual 
observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or 
adversary, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a 
particular area. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Intelligence, Joint Publication 2-0 (Washington, DC: Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, 2013), I–11. 
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South Vietnamese military personnel, and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operatives 
across a span of nearly 20 years.20 The specialized U.S. units recruited North Vietnamese 
enemy prisoners of war (POWs) and trained them in reconnaissance, resistance force 
training, and sabotage operations.21 The North Vietnamese government was extremely 
concerned about “spy rangers” dropping from above.22 Military units were relocated and 
quick reaction force parties were designated to respond to the threat imposed by the 
MACVSOG. The overall deception that the small force created was instrumental in the 
larger U.S. campaign.  
The MACVSOG example shows the importance of using a small-scale airborne 
operation for combat and to gather intelligence. The “smaller is better” approach was 
effective because of its ability to infiltrate behind enemy lines and identify adversary 
locations. These reconnaissance missions laid the groundwork for many operations today. 
Units, such as the U.S. 75th Ranger Regiment, various SOF, and other surgical strike 
units, have reaped the benefits of using military free-fall insertions for reconnaissance 
missions. 
2. Raids 
Raids offer an important role for small-scale airborne operations because of the 
aggressor’s ability to conduct surprise entry with swift execution and rapid exit.23 Raids 
render key targets operationally ineffective with the use of force. Raids are intended, 
among other things, to temporarily seize an objective, to conduct hostage rescue, and 
                                                 
20 Many of these teams were infiltrated by airborne; however, the Viet Minh were experts in tracking 
and running down commando teams. Once on the ground, most teams were captured, some executed, 
others imprisoned. Despite the questionable tactical success of the team’s output, the parachute infiltration 
served as the most viable employment mechanism for that situation. Robert M. Gillespie, Black Ops, 
Vietnam: The Operational History of MACVSOG (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2011), 5. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Richard H. Shultz, The Secret War Against Hanoi: The Untold Story of Spies, Saboteurs, and 
Covert Warriors in North Vietnam (New York: Perennial, 2000), 111. 
23 JP 1–02 defines a raid as an operation to seize an area temporarily to secure information, confuse an 
adversary, capture personnel or equipment, or to destroy a capability. It ends with a planned withdrawal 
upon completion of the assigned mission. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Dictionary of 
Military and Associated Terms (Joint Publication 1-02) (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 
November 2010 as amended through August 15, 2014), 302. 
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non-combatant evacuation operations (NEOs). History is full of examples that date back 
to the Germans at Eben Emael and the United States at Los Banos in the World War II. 
The Germans effectively utilized airborne raiding in their earlier conquests in 
Europe. The raid and capture of the Eben Emael fortress was made famous for utilizing 
an airborne force to overtake what was considered to be a nearly impregnable fortress.24 
German gliders skillfully landed paratroopers directly onto the objective and swiftly 
overtook the Belgium stronghold. No longer was the raiding force limited to strictly a 
ground attack and withdrawal; airborne raiding expanded the options. 
The daring operation to liberate the prisoners at Los Banos in the Pacific Theater 
during World War II exemplified a textbook airborne raid. General Macarthur ordered 
the 11th airborne division commander to liberate the approximately 2,200 prisoners held 
by the Japanese at Los Banos prison.25 Minimal casualties and mission success were 
attributed to good intelligence, good planning, and faultless execution. The Los Banos 
prison raid is considered by some to be the most successful small-scale airborne 
operation.26 
The Los Banos raid showed strategists and military commanders the value of 
using airborne infiltration to surprise the enemy with swift, expedient strikes. 
Contemporary examples of airborne raids include the Navy SEAL team military free-fall 
(MFF) operation into Somalia to rescue two aid workers from a terrorist organization.27 
Another raid example was the U.S. Army SF in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) who 
conducted a raid on a target known to have an extensive early warning network in an 
                                                 
24 William H. McRaven, Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice 
(New York: Presidio Press, 1996), 29–67. 
25 During the conduct of the operation, the raiding airborne force completely surprised the prison 
guards. In swift execution, the operation took no more than 20 minutes; the entire 243-man prison guard 
detachment was dead. In a combined effort, trucks, amphibious tracks, and air transport were coordinated 
to facilitate the withdrawal and evacuation of prisoners. Gerard M. Devlin, Paratrooper!: The Saga of U.S. 
Army and Marine Parachute and Glider Combat Troops During World War II (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1979), 598. 
26 Ibid., 610. 
27 Jeffrey Gettleman, Eric Schmitt, and Thom Shanker, “U.S. Swoops in to Free 2 from Pirates in 
Somali Raid,” The New York Times, accessed March 12, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/26/ 
world/africa/us-raid-frees-2-hostages-from-somali-pirates-html. 
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austere environment. The operational detachment used MFF airborne infiltration to seal 
the objective without alerting the presence of an incoming raid.28 The relevancy of the 
raid is ever-present, as modern warfare demands specially trained units to strike an 
adversary at a moment’s notice. 
3. Special Warfare 
Airborne infiltration in special warfare relies heavily on speed and stealth to avoid 
detection. Special warfare typically includes clandestine infiltration, which makes 
airborne infiltration a good fit for these types of missions.29 Airborne offers this spectrum 
set of missions a speedy and stealthy method of linking up with indigenous forces. 
Airborne utility in special warfare dates back to the World War II Office of Strategic 
Services (OSS)/Jedburgh teams.30  
Infiltrating by parachute behind enemy lines into France allowed the Jedburghs to 
gain access for linkup with the French resistance. The Jedburghs relayed intelligence 
gathered from civilians in close proximity of targets to reduce collateral damage. The 
three man-teams conducted resistance operations initially and shifted to guerilla warfare 
once the lodgment area was secure. The guerrilla operations included “sabotaging 
communications, attacking enemy supply depots, command posts, and road and rail 
traffic, and, where necessary, preventing enemy demolition or bridges or other structures 
that were needed by the allies.”31 Airborne served as the method to get these teams into 
areas they needed to be to fulfill their mission. 
                                                 
28 ODA 074 conducted a combat standoff MFF insertion into Iraq in support of OIF on May 30, 2007. 
29 Special warfare as the execution of activities that involve a combination of lethal and nonlethal 
actions taken by a specially trained and educated force that has a deep understanding of cultures and 
foreign language, proficiency in small-unit tactics, and the ability to build and fight alongside indigenous 
combat formations in a permissive, uncertain, or hostile environment. Department of Defense, Department 
of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Joint Publication 1-02), 343. 
30 Operation Jedburgh was a part of the larger operational plan devised for Operation Overlord. In 
doing so, the Jedburghs and OSS could organize, train, and equip the resistance forces to cut off rail lines 
and obstruct roads using ambush and sabotage methods. Andrew L. Hargreaves, Special Operations in 
World War II: British and American Irregular Warfare, vol. 39 (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma 
Press, 2013), 1–9. 
31 Hargreaves, Special Operations in World War II: British and American Irregular Warfare, 1–9. 
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The Jedburghs example shows the importance of investing in human capital with 
specialized training for elite soldiers. The amount of time and resources invested in the 
Jedburghs was a small fraction of the overall war budget and the payoff was tremendous 
for the Allies. Currently, the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) recognizes the 
utility of airborne in special warfare and is currently making changes to instill a 
“collective military free-fall capability throughout the Army’s Special Forces Regiment 
[that will] ensure the U.S. Army’s unconventional-warfare force can effectively enter and 
perform within the operational areas of today and tomorrow.”32 The true test for utilizing 
this force will be the political acceptance for the amount of risk these elite soldiers face in 
special warfare missions. 
4. Summary of Small-scale Airborne Operations 
Evaluating the effectiveness of small-scale airborne operations may not be as 
simple as examining the track record of successful vs. non-successful missions. Recons, 
raids, and special warfare have a high degree of success throughout history. Finding the 
relevancy in modern warfare is a more beneficial way to evaluate the small-scale roles. A 
common tool in the military for discussing applicable doctrine is called C4ISR. This 
evaluation tool is useful in highlighting how the U.S. military is fighting air, land, and sea 
battles against future opponents. The same evaluation criteria are used for small and 
large-scale airborne operations. 
Small-scale airborne operations are most successful when units implement a 
decentralized command and control structure. These units work independently behind 
enemy lines in small teams emphasizing a simple, effective command and control 
structure. Using this flattened command structure is beneficial when operating in denied 
territories with minimal resources. Newer technologies in communications and computers 
are ever evolving. SOF operators now communicate under canopy with advanced 
technologies in radio. MFF jumpmasters are now using computers for calculating global 
positioning system (GPS) high altitude release points (HARP) and designated impact 
                                                 
32 Charles Cleveland, ARSOF 2022 Document (Ft. Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Special Operations 
Command, 2014), 20. 
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points (DIP) for a more reliable and successful landing. These types of equipment 
fielding also streamline the communications process for relaying intelligence, calling in 
air strikes, or requesting resupply. SOF missions will continue to require advanced 
training and equipment fielding.  
C. THE UTILITY OF LARGE-SCALE AIRBORNE OPERATIONS 
Large-scale airborne utility is often used when a military force aims to seize 
terrain with a large amount of personnel. These operations are used as a forced entry 
technique to gain access to an area of operation. Figure 3 illustrates the primary roles of 
large-scale airborne roles-seize, show of force, and reinforce.33 This section argues the 
validity of large-scale roles with a scaled-down degree in size and strength. 
 








                                                 
33 Department of the Army, Airborne Operations: Field Manual 90-26, 1–5. 
34 This figure provides insight of the key components to the primary small-scale airborne roles. 
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1. Seize 
Seizing serves as a primary role for large-scale airborne operations with airfield 
seizure as the most prominent form.35 The securing of a lodgment, such as an airfield, 
allows the airborne force to facilitate the air landing of follow-on forces. This role was 
frequently employed in World War II, such as the U.S. seizure at Nadzab Airfield.36  
The seizure of the Nadzab airfield in the Pacific theater during World War II 
offers a historical example of a well-planned and executed airborne operation. This 
operation was a part of General MacArthur’s great counter-offensive north towards the 
heart of Japan.37 The airborne troops were tasked to seize the Nadzab Airfield and 
facilitate the air-landing forces; ultimately fighting towards the amphibious attacking 
forces at the city of Lae, New Guinea. Ensuring adequate air protection for the airborne 
forces, the Air Force commander supporting the raid provided no less than 100 fighter 
aircraft to provide protection for the air transport planes in route to the drop zone (DZ).38 
Bombers prepared the DZ with machine gun fire, bombs, and finally smoke, to conceal 
the parachute drops and landings. At execution, all three airborne battalions from the 
1/503RD Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR) were dropped with pinpoint accuracy in less 
than five minutes.39 The seizure of the airfield was the first massed accurate delivery of a 
large-scale airborne force.40 
This account demonstrates the massive amount of logistics involved in conducting 
a joint, combined airborne operation. When a division is deployed, one airborne brigade 
provides logistics, one is on reserve, and one conducts the jump. Massive amounts of 
                                                 
35 JP 1-02 defines seizure as employing combat forces to occupy physically and to control a 
designated area. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated 
Terms (Joint Publication 1-02), 327. 
36 The German seizure of Maleme Airfield in WWII was another example of a large-scale raid; 
however, the success was marginal due to weather and bad intelligence. 
37 Macarthur wanted to seize and occupy the city of Lae and nearby Nadzab Airfield to use as a 
stepping stone northward. The operation involved using an intricate combination of airborne, amphibious, 
and air-landing troops. Devlin, Paratrooper!: The Saga of U.S. Army and Marine Parachute and Glider 
Combat Troops During World War II, 255. 
38 Ibid., 261. 
39 Ibid., 262. 
40 Ibid. 
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time, preparation, planning, and personnel are required to make this operation successful. 
The debate arises when a more capable opponent in the defense has advanced technology 
in A2AD to combat massing airborne infiltration. This debate is further explored in the 
technology section of this thesis. 
2. Show of Force 
A fully activated airborne unit may serve as a show of force to an adversary on 
the verge of committing troops.41 The activated airborne unit is placed on alert as an 
escalating military step during a potential global conflict or crisis. Although show of 
force is not an actual mission-set for airborne forces, it showcases a nation’s strength in 
military might and can signal a level of commitment to partner forces. The Yom Kippur 
War and a more recent NATO training exercise are both examples of using a show of 
force.42 
The 82nd Airborne Division demonstrated a show of force during the Yom 
Kippur War in 1973. The entire 82nd Airborne Division with 15,000 personnel was 
alerted to prepare for deployment as a quick reaction force in response to the Yom 
Kippur War.43 The Soviets responded by activating three airborne divisions consisting of 
nearly 50,000 airborne troops on high alert.44 Fortunately, a cease-fire led to the de-
escalation of airborne troops on both sides. Without a ceasefire, little would have stopped 
the Soviets from moving into Egypt with airborne forces.45 The airborne show of force 
                                                 
41 JP 1-02 defines show of force as an operation, designed to demonstrate U.S. resolve, which involves 
increased visibility of U.S. deployed forces in an attempt to defuse a specific situation that if allowed to 
continue, may be detrimental to United States interests or national objectives. Department of Defense, 
Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Joint Publication 1-02), 332. 
42 Paratroopers from the 173rd Airborne Brigade conducted a training rotation with the Lithuanian 
Mechanized Infantry Brigade. The mission was intended to provide a show of force to Russia that the 
European allies and the United States were committed to protect the borders of sovereign countries in 
Eastern Europe. A. M. Lavey, “173rd Paratroopers Land in Lithuania,” U.S. Army, accessed March 12, 
2015, http://www.army.mil/article/124808/. 
43 John L. Scherer, “Soviet and American Behavior During the Yom Kippur War,” World Affairs 141, 
no. 1 (Summer 1978): 4. 
44 Ibid., 14. 
45 Ibid., 18. 
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option escalated on both sides and quickly signaled the level of commitment that both the 
United States and the Soviets had toward their respective allies.46  
Show of force and deterrence was a common tool used during the Cold War 
between the United States and USSR. The benefits far outweighed the cost of going to 
war. Today, the threat of military force weighs heavily on the adversary, which 
oftentimes chooses to seek other options in the face of the overwhelming opponent. With 
current state actors, such as China, North Korea and Iran, the United States would be 
wise to keep a large response force as a deterrent threat for future conflicts.47 
3. Reinforce 
The reinforce role for airborne utilization encompasses a wide breadth to include 
support to units beyond reach from land forces, exposed flanks, disrupt, degrade, deny, 
and delay.48 Famous large-scale airborne operations in World War II, by the French later 
in Indo-China,49 and more recently, the French in Mali are all examples of reinforcing 
troops by airborne insertion.50 
Operation OVERLORD combined the roles of both seizing and reinforcement 
operations for airborne infiltration into denied territory in Europe. The plan called for 
four infantry divisions onto the Normandy beaches with two airborne divisions inland 
                                                 
46 Both the United States and USSR conducted a show of force; however, the Soviets may have 
“showed the U.S.” more in troop strength and commitment. 
47 While there is little evidence that show of force deters, the lack of conflict may be an indicator that 
show of force was sufficient. 
48 JP 1-02 defines reinforcing as a support mission in which the supporting unit assists the supported 
unit to accomplish the supported unit’s mission. Only like units (e.g., artillery to artillery, intelligence to 
intelligence, armor to armor, etc) can be given a reinforcing/reinforced mission. Department of Defense, 
Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Joint Publication 1-02), 309. 
49 The French in Indo-China further developed the lessons learned in World War II and used them in 
their fight against the Viet Minh in the First Indo-China War (1946–1954). Similar to a modern day QRF, 
(quick reaction force), the French radioed in to their headquarters in Hanoi when bases were attacked. The 
Foreign Legion were loaded up onto German Junkers and dropped into the enemy vicinity for 
reinforcement. The Legion was dropped behind enemy lines to fix the enemy, disrupt, and provide centers 
of resistance. John Weeks, Assault from the Sky: A History of Airborne Warfare (Kirkwood, NY: Putnam 
Publishing Group, 1978), 125–131. 
50 In comparison to traditional airborne operations, the French airborne assaults in Mali would be 
considered small-scale by historical standards; however, the French airborne operations in Mali most 
appropriately reflect the airborne role of “reinforcing” and are categorized as such.  
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from the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions. The United States blocked German 
reinforcements and seized the bridges north of the town of Caene.51 Little groups of 
parachutists (LGOPs) confused the Germans due to scatter drops across the countryside. 
The two divisions were not able to seal off the beach completely, but did allow the Allied 
landing at Utah beach to proceed without much opposition.52 This operation was 
effective because of the Allies’ ability to surprise the enemy and strike deep into denied 
territory. 
The French in Mali displayed the most modern example of airborne serving in a 
seize and reinforce role. 53 The main objectives for Operation Serval relied on the use of 
airborne troops to maintain an “aggressive tempo.”54 The French leadership credited 
airborne for its audacity and speed that kept the enemy from organizing defenses.55 The 
first airborne operation consisted of 40 SOF forces and engineer equipment tasked to 
seize the airport of Tessalit and clear the dirt airstrip to allow follow-on forces to land 
reinforcements.56 The larger airborne operation included nearly 250 French paratroopers. 
This group of paratroopers conducted a static-line airborne infiltration into the northern 
part of Timbuktu to prevent AQIM from escaping into the northern deserts.57 The 
reinforcing airborne force effectively denied AQIM insurgents from using any of the 
established avenues of escape. In a display of both seizing and reinforcing, the French 
                                                 
51 Weeks, Assault from the Sky: A History of Airborne Warfare, 86. 
52 Weeks, Assault from the Sky: A History of Airborne Warfare, 90–91. 
53 In January 2012, the situation in Mali had deteriorated quickly. The disenfranchised Tuareg group 
in the northern regions of Mali initiated a movement called the National Movement of the Liberation of the 
Azawad (MNLA) combined with support from Islamic extremists group Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 
(AQIM) to lay claim and control of regions in northern Mali. The Government of Mali could do nothing 
but helplessly watch AQIM spread across the region. The deterioration of Mali occurred on the heels of the 
Libyan Civil War, which allowed an influx of weapons and military equipment to cross the borders and 
arm the Tuaregs and AQIM. Michael Shurkin, France’s War in Mali: Lessons for an Expeditionary Army 
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation 2014, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_ 
reports/RR700/RR770/RAND_RR770.pdf.  
54 Ibid., 10.  
55 Ibid. 
56 Shurkin, France’s War in Mali: Lessons for an Expeditionary Army, 21.  
57 NATO Defense College Conference, “The Future of Airborne Forces in NATO,” NDC Conference 
Report, Rome, Italy, April 2013, 2. 
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airborne operations in Mali during Operation Serval illustrated modern utility in an 
airborne force. 
These examples show the importance of inserting troops into areas that land 
forces are incapable of reaching. A large force is necessary to infiltrate the area, secure it, 
and conduct follow on operations when necessary. Combining both small and large-scale 
airborne units is an important lesson from this vignette. Sending in SOF first to recon and 
prepare for a larger force is a common tactics, techniques, and procedure (TTP) in U.S. 
DOD doctrine and airfield seizure TTPs.  
4. Summary of Large-scale Airborne Operations 
Specifically for airborne, the antiquated ways of organizing an inherently rapid 
infiltration technique with multiple layers of oversight stalls the real strengths of an 
airborne capability. Additionally, the large numbers of airborne paratroopers maintained 
for readiness, but rarely used, adds to another point of contention. Some military experts 
agree that an entire airborne division of parachutists does not make sense in modern 
warfare.58 The division, the brigade, the battalion, and even the company, all add an 
echelon of control that detracts from the lower tactical element’s rapid reaction 
capability. With a redesigned outlook on airborne organization and employment, a 
flattened command and control structure would allow an airborne force the flexibility to 
remain highly mobile, autonomous, and self-contained in response to the modern range of 
military operations.  
Large-scale airborne operations require a massive amount of support elements 
(brigade size) when deploying a divisional airborne element, which comes with the 
territory of training, equipping, funding, and transporting a large amount of soldiers. The 
command and control hierarchy is very top driven with detailed planning at the General 
level for coordinated execution all the way down to the squad. Newer technologies in 
communications and computers are not as necessary for basic level airborne operations. 
Soldiers require only five static line jumps prior to performing this mission with their 
                                                 
58 John Arquilla, Worst Enemy: The Reluctant Transformation of the American Military (Chicago, IL: 
Ivan R. Dee, 2008), 48. 
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unit. Massing a large amount of troops is troublesome in an age in which high-tech 
equipment is accessible on the black market. Intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance are crucial aspects prior to conducting a large-scale operation. The 
combination of using small units to infill for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance 
(ISR) is necessary prior to deploying any type of large force. Large-scale airborne 
operations are questionable in today’s operating environment in which technology trumps 
massing of forces. The next section discusses the current operating environment in more 
detail to further explain how airborne forces fit into modern warfare. 
D. CURRENT OPERATING ENVIRONMENT 
With over 35 small wars in existence and minimal conventional wars, the current 
operational landscape for warfare continues to evolve. Israeli military historian Martin 
van Creveld describes the environment as “large-scale, conventional war-war as 
understood by today’s principal military powers-may indeed be at its last gasp; however, 
war itself, war as such, is alive and kicking and about to enter a new epoch.”59 Across the 
spectrum of conflict, combatants organize as both state and non-state actors, employ 
conventional and irregular tactics, and blur the lines of warfare. Defining these types of 
conflict is complicated, as scholars and military professionals alike have attempted an 
array of terms including asymmetric warfare,60 fourth generation warfare,61 hybrid 
warfare,62 irregular warfare,63 and gray area warfare.64 Although not all these terms are 
                                                 
59 Martin van Creveld. Transformation of War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2009), 2. 
60 Asymmetric warfare: In military operations the application of dissimilar strategies, tactics, 
capabilities, and methods to circumvent or negate an opponent’s strengths while exploiting his weaknesses. 
Department of Defense, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Joint 
Publication 1–02), 19. 
61 Fourth-generation warfare: “The fourth generation has evolved in ways that take advantage of the 
political, social, economic, and technical changes since World War II. It makes use of the advantages those 
changes offer an unconventional enemy.” Thomas X. Hammes, Insurgency: Modern Warfare Evolves into 
a Fourth Generation (Washington, DC: National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic 
Studies, 2005), 2. 
62 Hybrid warfare: “In hybrid warfare, the adversary most likely presents unique combinational threats 
specifically designed to target U.S. vulnerabilities. Instead of separate challengers with fundamentally 
different approaches (conventional, irregular, or terrorist), we can expect to face competitors who will 
employ all forms of war, including criminal behavior, perhaps simultaneously.” Frank G. Hoffman, Hybrid 
Threats: Reconceptualizing the Evolving Character of Modern Conflict (Washington, DC: National 
Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, 2009), 5. 
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considered military doctrine, they all represent a category along a spectrum of warfare 
that is ever-evolving and adapting.65  
Not only are the types of warfare difficult to define, but also so are the types of 
existing threats to the United States. The two threats that airborne forces continue to 
combat are state and non-state actors. State actors aim to control territory, which is the 
main theme in large-scale airborne roles (seize, show of force, and reinforce). Non-state 
actors do not control territory; however, they often operate amongst the population in 
irregular conflicts. This section defines both state and non-state actors in modern warfare 
to show how airborne units maintain relevancy in the fight. 
1. State Actor Threats 
Traditionalists view that the future of conflict will likely remain conventional and 
reflect state-on-state warfare. The United States and its allies are facing state threats that 
include rogue regimes, such as North Korea and Iran who continue to challenge the 
safety of global security.66 North Korea threatens American diplomacy with “provocation 
and tensions in East and South China Sea,” which create increased risk for allied 
partners.67 Iran threatens the goal of nonproliferation for nuclear weapons with ambitions 
of attaining capabilities within three months.68 Both regimes continue to disregard global 
security efforts for establishing international cooperation. 
                                                                                                                                                 
63 Irregular warfare: A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence 
over the relevant population(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may 
employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, 
and will. Also called IW. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and 
Associated Terms (Joint Publication 1–02). 
64 Gray area warfare: Gray area phenomena combine elements of traditional warfighting with those of 
organized crime. Steven Metz, Armed Conflict in the 21st Century: The Information Revolution and Post-
modern Warfare (Washington, DC: National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, 
2000), XII. 
65 Hoffman, Hybrid Threats: Reconceptualizing the Evolving Character of Modern Conflict, 1–7. 
66 Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), 1. 
67 White House, 2015 National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: White House, 2015), 10. 




Other external threats to the United States and its allies arise from global powers, 
such as China and Russia, which strive to modernize their militaries for future conflict. 
Increasing tensions throughout Southeast Asia and the Pacific indicate expansionist 
efforts by the Chinese that shake the regional balance.69 One of the largest trading 
partners with the United States, China “will continue seeking to counter U.S. strengths 
using anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) approaches and by employing other new cyber 
and space control technologies.”70 Russia, which provides large amounts of natural gas to 
many European states, has violated Ukraine’s territorial integrity and national 
sovereignty, while endangering international norms with other neighboring countries.71 
Of course, other states threaten the United States and other territories; however, this 
sample summary illustrates the dynamically evolving security environment. Large-scale 
units are a necessary component against an adversary that holds terrain. 
2. Non-state Actors 
Following the attacks on 9/11, the United States experienced a new threat from 
non-state actors and terrorist organizations. Like the attackers of the World Trade Center, 
these adversaries will now utilize custom-designed irregular capabilities to attack 
American vulnerabilities. Foreign fighters and terrorist threats continue to increase 
because of the porous borders, lack of security, and sectarian violence in fragile states 
across the Middle East and Africa. Countries, such as Tunisia, Libya, Yemen, and Egypt, 
harbor terrorists who “seek to exploit transitional governments and expand their 
influence.”72 These non-state actors range from Daesh or Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 
(ISIS), to Boko Haram in Nigeria, to Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), to Al 
Shabaab in Somalia. These “terrorists remain willing and able to threaten the United 
States, our citizens, and our interests—from conducting major and well-coordinated 
                                                 
69 Roberts Sutter, “Asia’s Importance, China’s Expansion, and U.S. Strategy: What Should be Done?,” 
Asia Pacific Bulletin, no. 283 (October 28, 2014), http://scholarspace.manoa.hawaii.edu/bitstream/handle/ 
10125/34255/apb%20no.283.pdf?sequence=1. 
70 Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), 6. 
71 White House, 2015 National Security Strategy, 10. 
72 Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), 5. 
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attacks to executing attacks that are smaller and less complex.”73 Terrorist aspirations for 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are a constant threat to U.S. national strategy. 
Foreign terrorist groups affiliated with al Qa’ida, as well as individual terrorist leaders, 
may seek to recruit or inspire Westerners to carry out attacks against the U.S. homeland 
with little or no warning.74 Small-scale units are a perfect fit against these expeditionary 
transnational actors that do not hold terrain.  
3. Summary of Current Operating Environment 
One certainty about warfare is the difficulty in predicting what the future of 
conflict will be. Given both categories of warfare, it seems that a conservative position on 
this debate is that conflict will consist in some hybrid form between conventional and 
irregular. However, conventional and SOF camps agree that irregular aspects of fighting 
will continue into the foreseeable future. In tallying the recent types of conflicts, the 
overwhelming amount of irregular conflict that occurs between state and non-state actors 
cannot be discounted, as well as the much fewer that occur between states. Given this 
overall increase in irregular conflict, military and strategic decision makers must prepare 
forces to deal with the myriad of changes in warfare for the near future.  
E. SUMMARY OF AIRBORNE ROLES 
Using U.S. doctrine as a guide, this section has categorized airborne roles into 
small and large-scale. Small-scale airborne roles consist of reconnaissance, raid, and 
special warfare, while large-scale airborne roles consist of seize, show of force, and 
reinforce. Each role displayed utility in historical and modern scenarios that lend credit to 
the continued relevancy of airborne. While not all roles are utilized equally, or even 
frequently in modern crises and conflict, a comprehensive look at airborne roles and 
utility may offer decision makers new perspectives for military force organization.  
As the debate over force structure continues, the manner in which units are 
organized will increasingly be called into question. Budget constraints, risk, political 
                                                 
73 Ibid., 8. 
74 Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), 8. 
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implications, evolving threat, and emerging technology are only a few of the long list of 
force structure considerations. For these reasons, the DOD continually reassesses the 
military force structure and organization to optimize the fighting force for modern 
warfare. Many traditionalists seek to maintain larger hierarchal force structures, while 
progressives seek to reorganize into smaller de-centralized force structures. Whether a 
traditionalist, progressive, or moderate approach is taken, this research urges the DOD to 
closely consider the roles and utility of airborne when re-thinking the military force 
structure and future operational concepts. 
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III. THE TECHNOLOGICAL FRAME OF REFERENCE 
Technological understanding and the effects of major innovations date back to the 
beginning of warfare.75 William McNeill, for example, in his seminal book, The Pursuit 
of Power, addresses the broad focus of technology in armed conflict by hearkening back 
to numerous historical cases of innovations that altered warfare.76 These innovations had 
profound effects on military force structures. For example, detailed mapping, skilled staff 
officers, written orders, and a re-organized force structured into divisions allowed French 
commanders of the 18th century to increase the size of their armies while maintaining 
effective command and control on the battlefield.77 Additionally, railroads, steamships, 
and the electronic telegraph of the 19th century afforded the mass mobilization of 
Moltke’s armies and supplies that allowed for extended fighting campaigns across great 
distances.78 The theme that emerges from these cases is that military force structures and 
fighting doctrine were adjusted to account for these changes. An informed technological 
frame of reference is required to make appropriate airborne organizational changes.  
Drawing back on the Guderian example pre-World War II, the German 
technological frame of reference came from both broad and narrow advances. The broad 
frame stemmed from advances in communications and radio capabilities that afforded 
maneuver units greater mobility across larger distances. The narrow frame of reference 
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specifically considered advances in mobile artillery, tank mobility, and attack aircraft. 
These technological advances, when properly combined, organized and employed, 
overcame the vulnerabilities of attritional warfare from World War I and paved the way 
for early German success in World War II. The developers of new technologies for that 
era pursued new “tools” to overcome vulnerabilities with capabilities. What led to 
success, however, were not the technological tools themselves, but the reorganization and 
application of the tools. By addressing the modern technological frame of reference, it 
becomes clearer to see that airborne force structures and new operational concepts are 
needed to operate more effectively in times of a rapidly changing technological 
environment.  
This section examines technology from a broad and narrow frame of reference to 
justify rethinking the airborne organization and adopting new military operational 
concepts that fit this era. The broad frame provides the overall global context, while the 
narrow frame addresses airborne specific technological vulnerabilities and capabilities. 
As Figure 4 indicates, the broad frame of reference argues that new technologies are 
transferring power from large hierarchal structures to smaller formations, which displays 
the linkages between technology and the potential influences on how militaries can 
organize based on technological advancements. Therefore, airborne utility is indirectly 
affected by broader technological changes. The narrow frame of reference addresses the 
tools of technology that directly influence airborne utility. Modern airborne 
vulnerabilities include advancing and proliferating A2AD systems, armored enemy 
ground forces, and non-stealthy deployment aircraft. Modern airborne capabilities consist 
of improved parachute systems and high-tech airborne equipment. The resulting analysis 
from the frames of reference concludes that SOF airborne units will greatly benefit from 
organizing into smaller-scale units of action to maintain speed and stealth; additionally, 
conventional forces can benefit from organizing into smaller, but more protected—with 
armor—to survive the modern A2AD threat network. The outcomes from each of these 
broad and narrow technology frames of reference provide the context for the argument to 




Figure 4.  Technological Frame of Reference: Broad and Narrow79 
A. BROAD TECHNOLOGICAL FRAME OF REFERENCE 
The rise of the information age is characterized by a shift in traditional industry to 
one based on information, computerization, and networking. As many scholars suggest, 
the information age is greatly impacting military affairs, which in many ways, affects 
how modern institutions are organized. This “information revolution” is primarily based 
on the technological abilities to collect and receive massive amounts of data and smartly 
process it into useful and manageable packets of information.80 Examples of these 
enabling technologies include computers, satellites, GPS, and worldwide 
communications. Military specific examples include C4ISR, such as drones and other 
advanced aircraft sensors for gathering and processing data. These systems challenge 
how organizations traditionally function. Hierarchical, top-down, organizational 
structures work much less efficiently due to the massive increase in the flow of 
information. New technologies, rather, have transferred power to lower levels. “The 
information revolution empowers the network form,” writes Arquilla, “undermining most 
hierarchies.”81 Lower-level efficiency rewards institutions that organize into smaller 
groups. A smaller formation has the ability to react much faster to information than a 
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Broad Tech Frame of Reference 
 
• New technologies devolve power 
• Mobility to smaller formations 
• Larger formations are imperiled 
• “Small and Many” over “Large and Few” 
Narrow Tech Frame of Reference 
 
• New technologies create airborne vulnerabilities 
• SAMs, non-stealthy A/C, lack of ground mobility 
• New technologies enhance airborne capabilities 
• Parachute and equipment advances, armor and 
mobility 
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larger formation that has several hierarchal levels to move through. In essence, largely 
organized institutions are falling behind to the more flattened, smaller institutions, which 
greatly impacts military organizations. 
Modern military organizations serve as a model of large hierarchical institutions 
plagued by inefficiencies. An institution of this size also places great value in large 
platforms. Today, large platforms, such as tanks, ships, and planes dominate the 
battlefield. Martin Libicki argues that the days of platform dominance are coming to an 
end.82 The large military platforms so dominant today will yield to many systems 
composed of sensors, emitters, microbots, and miniprojectiles able to detect, track, target, 
and destroy.83 Advancing technologies resulting from the information age will continue 
to reward smaller units. In this way, Libicki believes that the “small and many” will 
replace the “large and few.” 
The broad technological concepts of the information age provide context to 
military organizations about how to structure forces and adopt operational concepts for 
future conflict and crises. While traditional mindsets display resistance to such changes, it 
cannot be denied that networks are replacing hierarchies as the more effective 
organizational structure. Holistically, “small and many” over “large and few” evokes a 
new mindset, especially in military affairs. Certainly, all military services and their 
respective branches can benefit from updated thinking in organizational structures. As the 
previous section suggests, airborne concepts standout as an adaptable infiltration 
capability with a wide breadth of utility from small to large-scale. The technologies that 
specifically relate to the evolution of the airborne capability directly influence the 
airborne impact on future operational concepts.  
                                                 
82 Martin Libicki, “The Small and Many,” excerpted from John Arquilla and David F. Ronfeldt, 
United States Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and National Defense Research 
Institute (U.S.), In Athena’s Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age (Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND, 1997). 
83 Ibid., 191. 
 31 
B. NARROW TECHNOLOGICAL FRAME OF REFERENCE 
1. Airborne Technological Vulnerabilities 
Modern vulnerabilities to airborne forces are a direct result of technological 
improvements to counter-measures. These counter-measures are A2AD systems and 
armored ground forces. The specific areas of concern for airborne forces are surface-to-
air missiles (SAMs), advanced artillery, non-stealthy deployment aircraft, mobility, and 
armored protection on the ground. These challenges can be summarized as “getting to the 
fight, getting into the fight, and staying in the fight.”84 In addressing these airborne 
vulnerabilities, the DOD must consider the premiums placed on the capabilities of the 
adversary’s defense; in the A2AD environment, defense seems to prevail as the dominant 
form. An adversary can much easier offset the costs of defending as opposed to an 
offensive maneuver, which closely relates to Robert Jervis’ concepts developed in 
“Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma.” Jervis refers to a security dilemma of this 
type as the puzzle of offense/defense balance and the ability to distinguish between an 
offense or defense posture.85 Jervis would classify the airborne dilemma as a defensive 
dominant scenario in which the defender, with A2AD capabilities, can easily inflict a 
serious amount of damage on the employment of a traditional large-scale offensive 
airborne force.86 
A2AD87 threats pose a significant challenge to airborne forces and create critical 
vulnerabilities to airborne employment.88 The key adversary capabilities to pose the 
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greatest threat to joint forces in future operations are high quality air defense and long-
range artillery rocket systems.89 In the 1970s, the best adversary mobile air defense 
system was the SA-6 SAM with a range of approximately 25 km. Today, the state of the 
art air defense systems have a maximum effective range against non-stealthy aircraft of 
approximately 400 km.90 Additionally, the ability to employ and operate mobile artillery 
and rocket launchers on possible friendly lodgment sites at airfields and seaports pose 
great security threats. Modern mobile rocket launchers can reach ranges of more than 50 
km.91 The A2AD threats directly implicate the Army’s premier forcible entry capability 
of airborne assault.92  
Airborne transport aircraft presents challenges that manifest themselves into 
vulnerabilities for airborne forces due to the exposure to A2AD threats. The nature of 
transport aircraft used for airborne operations is that it cannot fly stealthily, which leaves 
the aircraft and airborne occupants exposed to SAM threats in their attempts to get to the 
fight. The U.S. Air Force supports the majority of airborne operations utilizing C-130s or 
C-17s. C-17s fulfill the strategic reach option and C-130s satisfy intra-theater 
requirements. Both types of aircraft are non-stealthy. Similarly, the U.S. Army’s rotary 
wing assets do not have a stealth capable helicopter to deploy airborne forces. Critics 
point to many other shortcomings with the military’s transport aircraft in modern A2AD 
environments to include the number of aircraft available, reach and weight limitations, 
and austere airfield landing/takeoff capabilities.93 For all the technological vulnerabilities 
mentioned, airborne transport aircraft limits what airborne forces can accomplish. 
The fear is that A2AD systems and technologies will not be limited to a few state 
actors, but will proliferate to other states further complicating the ability to achieve 
access and operate in contested areas of the world.94 Reports indicate that nearly 100,000 
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such systems exist in the arsenals of over 100 states and at least 13 non-state groups, such 
as Hezbollah, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and the Tamil 
Tigers.95 Sub-states and non-state actors actively seek to gain and employ SAMs. A2AD 
systems thwart the efforts of airborne forces to “get to the fight, get into the fight, and 
stay in the fight.” 
2. Airborne Technological Capabilities 
Advances in airborne technological capabilities attempt to mitigate the 
vulnerabilities just surveyed. Technological developments in improved parachutes, 
advanced airborne equipment, and new concept aircraft are examples of such attempts. 
This sub-section addresses the technological capabilities from both SOF and conventional 
forces; modern airborne forces reflect a dichotomy in capabilities optimized for specific 
purposes. Currently, SOF focuses on extending airborne capabilities to infiltrate with 
more stealth, speed, and precision in special warfare environments. Conventional forces, 
arguably, should seek to include more armored protection for survivability and mobility 
in the modern A2AD environment.  
New parachute systems offer improved capabilities of airborne infiltration. The 
U.S. Army updated the static-line parachute system used for dropping airborne soldiers at 
low altitudes. The T-11 replaced the T-10D, which afforded the paratrooper a greater 
degree of maneuverability under canopy and greater parachute reliability, which 
ultimately, reduced the risk of injury. For United States Special Operations Forces 
(USSOF) forces, the U.S. Army updated the MFF parachute system used for dropping 
airborne soldiers at high altitudes. The RA-1 replaced the MC-4 that allowed the operator 
to carry more weight, travel farther distances under canopy, and give a higher degree of 
precision on the DZ. The MFF parachute continues to offer the military a stealth capable 
parachute for the purposes of clandestine infiltration. 
                                                 
95 Max Boot, “The Paradox of Military Technology,” The New Atlantis, 20, Fall 2006, 
http://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/the-paradox-of-military-technology.  
 34 
Future concepts of airborne parachute development include the use of modified 
wing suits to propel operators at even greater distances than standard parachutes.96 The 
operator would glide with a fixed set of short wings across distances up to 40 miles to 
infiltrate into an area. Continued development in parachute capability and new troop 
delivery concepts push the boundaries of modern airborne thought. Future concepts can 
greatly enhance the ability of the U.S. military to mitigate the increasing A2AD threat. 
In the interim, incremental advances in airborne supporting equipment provide 
paratroopers and operators with greater capability. Rarely publicized due to the classified 
nature of most USSOF operations, MFF airborne infiltrations are becoming increasingly 
more relevant.97 The leading attribute of infiltrating USSOF with MFF is stealth. 
Advanced technological equipment—night vision, parachute navigational (Paranav) aids, 
and landing assist applications—enhances the stealth capability. Stealthy infiltration 
allows USSOF to enter contested or denied areas of operations discreetly. The 
development of technology in MFF equipment compliments the Army SOF mid-term 
vision of increased airborne clandestine capability to overcome operational access 
vulnerabilities.98 
Unlike the stealth strengths of MFF infiltration, conventional equipment 
capability enhancements need to provide the airborne force with mobility and protection 
once on the battlefield. Non-stealthy transport planes used by airborne forces are highly 
vulnerable in a more advanced A2AD environment. Advocates of airborne forcible entry 
recommend further developments in light armored vehicles to give increased mobility 
and protection.99 Airborne conventional units could be dropped further behind enemy 
lines/areas and away from air defense threats to maneuver in armored vehicles onto the 
enemy. The Russians originally developed the concepts and vehicles designed to improve 
mobility and protection for airborne forces. To reduce scatter and dispersion of airborne 
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forces on the DZ, the Russians packed all equipment and personnel inside lightly armored 
vehicles and dropped them by parachute.100 Once landed, the equipped vehicles could 
immediately begin movement to the objective.  
The U.S. military has yet to adopt a lightly armored airborne vehicle capable of 
accomplishing the requirements necessary to operate effectively in an A2AD 
environment. The U.S. military solution was thought to be the Stryker combat vehicles; 
however, fully equipped weight of the vehicle became a restriction for airborne use. A 
mounted, armored vehicle capability for airborne forces offers a viable solution to 
overcoming the distance challenge for airborne forces once on the ground.  
C. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has offered a brief summary of the broad and narrow technologies 
that must be considered for rethinking airborne organization. Broadly, the information 
age is ushering in new technologies that alters how institutions should organize. 
Narrowly, the technology race will continue to produce airborne capabilities to overcome 
vulnerabilities. Arguably, it is represented by a defensive-dominant era by placing heavy 
costs and risk on the airborne employer.101 An adversary can easily offset the airborne 
employer by exploiting the vulnerabilities. Airborne vulnerabilities, such as proliferating 
A2AD systems, non-stealthy transport aircraft, and ground mobility, create issues for 
airborne forces “getting to the fight, getting into the fight, and staying in the fight.” While 
the capabilities certainly do not eliminate the concerns of airborne vulnerabilities, they 
greatly compliment the mitigating efforts.  
Advancements in technology will continue to improve upon parachute systems 
and airborne equipment. Even yet, future technological developments may very well 
eliminate the need or outweigh the cost of employing an airborne force altogether. 
However, the foreseeable future seems to indicate incremental advancements of airborne 
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capabilities designed to overcome their vulnerabilities. To summarize the findings, SOF 
airborne units will greatly benefit from organizing into smaller-scale units of action to 
maintain speed and stealth. Additionally, conventional forces require organizing into 
smaller, but more protected units of action—with armor—to survive the modern A2AD 
threat network. In application of these two concepts, the former can be done at a fraction 
of the price to maintain SOF proficiency in airborne. Rather, the conventional force 
requires additional funding to build and outfit armored protective vehicles capable of 
operating in the modern A2AD environment. 
More importantly, technology is not a replacement for effective organization, 
doctrine, and strategy. All the technological tools mentioned in this section require 
careful consideration of military commanders and decision makers to employ and 
organize airborne forces effectively. As Max Boot indicates, the paradox of today’s age is 
that modern technology is both “the great separator and the great equalizer in military 
affairs.”102 In understanding this paradox, technology alone cannot be wholly relied upon 
as the solution, but rather serves as a frame of reference to consider other areas of change. 
The following chapter serves to introduce the concept of swarming and how airborne 
forces can use the technological capabilities of the modern era to thrive under a new 
doctrine of fighting.  
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IV. AIRBORNE DESIGN AND THE SWARMING CONCEPT 
Given the preceding discussions of airborne history, along with emerging 
technological and threat environments, this section addresses a force developmental 
strategy and doctrine in rethinking airborne organization. More specifically, the authors 
argue that the DOD should consider restructuring the airborne force by organizing into 
smaller, decentralized, integration-focused airborne units of action while deliberately 
implementing a swarming concept to attain greater utility in modern and future warfare.  
Swarming offers airborne forces an updated way of fighting in the information 
age. Swarming is “seemingly amorphous, but it is a deliberately structured, coordinated, 
strategic way to strike from all directions, by means of a sustainable pulsing of force 
and/or fire, close-in as well as from stand-off positions.”103 The swarming concept relies 
on each one of the defined characteristics to operate effectively. The capabilities of an 
airborne force, detailed in previous sections, inherently satisfies many of the fighting 
characteristics of the swarming concept. As sweeping military structural change lingers at 
the decision-maker level, an airborne swarming concept can serve as an integral preview 
of the possibilities in implementing such an operational and force developmental strategy. 
Using the basic characteristics of swarming, this section applies swarming design 
elements to the modern airborne force.  
Figure 5 displays the six basic characteristics of swarming.  
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Figure 5.  Basic Characteristics of Swarming104 
Military thinkers have adopted their own concepts of reorganizing the military 
based on changing technology trends to optimize the force for the modern era. Douglas 
MacGregor, author of Breaking the Phalanx, advocates forming the military into smaller, 
more reactive Army groups. He illustrates how today’s military organizations look very 
similar to those of the past and alludes to the DOD’s resistance to change, which leads to 
an inefficient ability to wage modern warfare with outdated organizational structures. 
While technology has changed the tools used by military organizations, the organizations 
remain the same, hierarchal, top-down-driven units of action. In similar fashion, Bevin 
Alexander acknowledges that large concentrations of troops and weapons serve as targets 
for destruction, and in the future, will no longer exist.105 He builds the case that military 
units must be small, highly mobile, self-contained, and autonomous to survive.106 Bevin 
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Swarming Characteristics 
• Autonomous or semi-autonomous units engaging in convergent assault 
on a common target  
• Amorphous but coordinated way to strike from all directions—
“sustainable pulsing” of force or fire  
• Many small, dispersed, internetted maneuver units  
• Integrated surveillance, sensors, C4I for “topsight”  
• Stand-off and close-in capabilities  
• Attacks designed to disrupt cohesion of adversary  
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contends that the key to winning future wars is knowing when to move from one form of 
military organization to another.107 Other experts agree that organizational change in 
militaries can produce significant change in warfare.108  
Airborne forces can benefit from this line of thinking. Small-scale airborne roles 
would greatly benefit from a force reorganized into small, decentralized, and self-
contained units of action. The airborne roles in the small-scale category rely on stealth, 
speed, discreetness, and precision. These characteristics effectively fulfill the small-scale 
airborne roles, reconnaissance, raid, and special warfare. Similarly, large-scale airborne 
roles could still be accomplished from a force reorganized into a smaller form. Such a 
vision would entail small, dispersed airborne units of action infiltrating together to 
achieve relative superiority for the large-scale roles of airborne, seize, show of force, and 
reinforce. The concepts that Bevin and MacGregor propose for military structures and 
reorganization offer arguments that strengthen the utility of an airborne capability in the 
modern era. These concepts echo those of Arquilla and Ronfeldt under their predictions 
on future conflict and the diffusion of the “swarming” concept. Coupled with the 
previous section’s technological frame of reference on airborne capabilities and 
development, swarming can serve as an area of future growth for airborne concepts.  
A. AIRBORNE ROLES AND SWARMING 
Using swarming characteristics as a guide, Arquilla and Ronfeldt applied design 
elements that envision the military organizational structure for a swarming force capable 
of fighting in future conflict scenarios. The defined airborne roles—small- and large-
scale—identified in the previous sections, compliment the characteristics of swarming 
and can directly fulfill the design elements intended to create a fighting force for future 
conflict. The following design elements of swarming are used to assess the viability of an 
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airborne capability systematically in the swarming concept. An airborne force organized 
and employed with these design elements exhibit how parachute capable forces can 
effectively fight in future environments under new doctrine. Figure 6 displays the four 
design elements for a swarming concept.  
 
Figure 6.  Swarming Design Elements109 
B. MANY SMALL, DISPERSED, INTERNETTED MANEUVER UNITS 
A swarming force must be small, dispersed, and internetted to be decisive. Under 
the swarming concept, those characteristics can be exhibited by a restructured airborne 
force. First, airborne forces can easily be organized into “many and small” maneuver 
units. A “many and small” structure allows the swarming concept to work effectively. As 
previously argued, the age of platform dominance and other large military structures may 
be coming to an end. Large platforms only make larger targets; smaller elements are 
much more maneuverable, flexible, and make themselves much more difficult to be 
located and hit by modern weapons. In today’s environment, it is most likely that 
airborne forces will be called upon to secure lodgments—airports of debarkation (APOD) 
and sea ports of debarkation (SPOD)—rather than support large-scale ground force 
operations. The seizure of such lodgments can be especially challenging given the 
proliferation of A2AD capabilities to include SAMs employed by both state and non-state 
actors. Smaller elements of airborne units will prove much more effective in neutralizing 
such A2AD threats and suppressing enemy air defenses prior to the securing of 
lodgments to facilitate the advancement of follow-on forces.  
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Swarming Design Elements: 
• Many small, dispersed, internetted maneuver units 
• All-service coordination for mixing and matching 
• Both stand-off and close-in capabilities 
• Integrated surveillance, sensors, Command, Control, Communications, 
Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) for “topsight” 
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Second, airborne forces must be able to operate in dispersed fashion, often 
autonomously or with little guidance. Autonomy and the ability to act independently or 
loosely guided is a critical component of the swarming concept. A decentralized structure 
is critical to achieving autonomy. An accidental form of decentralized airborne structure 
occurred during the Allied World War II large-scale drops at Normandy when 
paratroopers coined the term LGOP. This term is affiliated with the small bands of 
determined paratroopers that came together to fight in autonomous fashion, despite being 
scattered all over the battlefield on unplanned DZs. Understanding the overall operational 
objectives and mission intent, the resilient LGOPs could effectively carry out the issued 
orders without additional guidance. Although the hierarchical division structure was 
utilized in the Normandy operations, it was the on-the-ground modifications made by the 
tactical elements that displayed the power of small, dispersed groups. 
A modern version of the World War II LGOP, under the swarming concept, 
would incorporate the strengths of reliable internetted communication between units of 
maneuver. LGOP mission intent would come from a flattened command structure that 
purposefully allowed the LGOP to accomplish mission intent autonomously. LGOPs 
could effectively swarm targets with overwhelming localized force to achieve relative 
superiority and re-disperse immediately following the completion of objectives.  
Third, swarming airborne forces must be closely internetted to allow maximum 
information dissemination. Early airborne forces could not accomplish it optimally 
without the information and internetted components of the modern information era. 
Modern radios, blue force trackers, and other reliable sources of communication 
technology allow military units to stay internetted for close coordination.  
C. ALL-SERVICE COORDINATION FOR MIXING AND MATCHING 
Using a doctrine of swarming, all-service coordination requires joint and 
combined arms efforts by all branches and services. Many small maneuver units cannot 
maintain an “all-purpose” approach to forces and equipment that existing military 
structures tend to maintain today. In this regard, a swarming force requires the support of 
other services to provide the logistical, medical, or fire support to make up for the loss in 
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capability. Logistically, and in combat, airborne forces continue to advance in this regard. 
The air transport support provided by the Air Force and Army Aviation assets 
demonstrate the all-service efforts to deliver and re-supply an airborne force. The heavy 
lift delivery capabilities of the C-17 and C-130 afford airborne units great reach across 
large distances and rapid delivery of logistical requirements. Modern GPS-guided 
bundles allow for precise resupply that does not require ground transport or additional 
support assets for delivery.  
In other displays of all-service coordination in a combat scenario, several 
Operational Detachment-Alphas (ODAs) demonstrated the power of well-coordinated 
fire during the beginning stages of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.110 These 
ODAs relied on close air support and naval fire support to employ precision guided 
munitions onto desired enemy targets. The ODAs directed the swarms of munitions onto 
their objectives, which effectively neutralized their targets. Mission success was achieved 
with a few ODAs, close air support, and the fighting support of host nations forces. 
Future scenarios of this type could easily utilize airborne infiltration to emplace small 
units of action quickly to reign down well-coordinated precision fire onto key objectives. 
D. BOTH STAND-OFF OR CLOSE-IN CAPABILITIES 
In this context, airborne forces are increasingly appropriate; the capabilities of 
modern parachutes offer both reliable stand-off and close-in employment for swarming 
by force. As noted in the technology section, modern SOF utilize MFF techniques to 
infiltrate clandestinely from great distances under parachute canopy to avoid detection. 
The SOF can achieve stand-off distances of up to 40 kilometers using the latest parachute 
systems. Programs are currently being implemented to expand the MFF capability to all 
Army SF operators.111 This program will build a clandestine stand-off infiltration 
capability to a specialized force already organized into small autonomous units of 
maneuver.  
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Stand-off not only refers to the parachute capability of an airborne force, but also 
the airborne operational ability to deploy quickly across great distances to troubled 
regions of the globe. Currently, the U.S. Army maintains the 82nd Airborne Division as a 
Global Response Force capable of reaching anywhere in the world within 96 hours of 
notification.112 While the 82nd Airborne Division maintains the traditional division 
structure, the parachute capability and air transport reach affords the unit strategic 
mobility to conduct contingency operations. Arguably, an entire airborne division is not 
required to accomplish the global response task. A re-organized airborne structure of 
“small and many” airborne groups would continue to allow strategic mobility and stand-
off reach with a greater degree of flexibility at a decentralized tactical level.  
Advances in static-line parachutes for close-in capabilities continue to be refined. 
For example, static-line parachute advancements have reduced the rates of injury on 
jumping to less than (.005) percent.113 Parachute capabilities in stand-off and close-in 
instances will continue to progress based on technological advancements in parachute 
systems to give enhanced, reliable mobility to swarming forces. 
Beyond the combat application of close-in capabilities, swarming with airborne 
forces can be used for the roles humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR). For 
example, close-in swarming effects of the U.S. forces in Haiti during the American 
intervention known as Operation Uphold Democracy demonstrates swarming for the 
roles of HA/DR. The 82nd airborne was prepared to enter Haiti forcibly by seizing 
airfields in preparation for follow-on forces, but negotiations by a political delegation 
allowed the forces to enter permissively. Air-landing thousands of paratroopers onto the 
Haitian airfields, the 82nd Airborne Division quickly converged into the area to provide 
critical aid to the Haitian people. Swarming in force for other peacekeeping and stability 
operations perhaps has greater utility in future crises opportunities.  
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E. INTEGRATED SURVEILLANCE 
Integrated surveillance refers to dispersed sensors and emitters with the 
operational ability to communicate and report between each other for the purposes of 
“topsight,” to provide the “big picture” view of what is occurring.114 The vision of 
turning the military into a “sensory organization” is a critical necessity of a swarming 
force.115 While small groups of paratroopers can certainly act as sensors for 
reconnaissance purposes, this job will likely go to much smaller and computerized 
sensors and emitters. As Libicki envisioned in his article, “The Small and Many,” 
miniaturized sensors and emitters will foreseeably be able to provide the necessary 
information for “finding.”116  
The integration of technology that enhances “finding” will empower the 
maneuver elements to react; it is within this scenario that small groups of airborne forces 
will likely benefit. The modern roles of airborne forces can be greatly enhanced by a 
well-integrated network of sensors.  
Historically, swarming forces were unable to achieve an internetted level of 
integration without the technology of the modern era. Yet, the power of small groups 
prevailed even without it. Demonstrating a successful effort of what a small, dispersed, 
autonomous group can accomplish despite the technology shortcomings is the British 
Special Operations Executive (SOE) during World War II.117 Airborne infiltration was 
among many of the insertion techniques exercised by the sabotage and subversion 
experts. The SOE employed low-level airborne insertions from 300 feet at night as a 
rapid infiltration technique to insert operatives deep into German territory.118 These 
discreet airborne insertions allowed the SOE commandos to gain access to austere areas 
throughout Europe and create havoc on the Nazis from all directions. Winston 
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Churchill’s direction to the SOE was to “set Europe ablaze.”119 Using this scenario in a 
contemporary context, imagine the possibilities of an integrated network of sensors and 
emitters to illuminate critical targets better for the SOE to create havoc.  
F. CONCLUSION 
Within in the realm of parachute capable forces, airborne units—when organized 
into small, decentralized units of maneuver—can offer renewed possibilities of increased 
relevance in modern conflict scenarios by adopting a swarming concept. In lieu of 
continuing to orient the airborne force towards large-scale action, the DOD should accept 
that it is highly unlikely to occur in the future. The DOD should instruct the Army to 
downsize the sheer numbers of airborne forces to match the modern and future likelihood 
of airborne implementation by organizing around small-scale operations. While large-
scale airborne implementation may occur, the re-organized airborne force into smaller 
units of action can “ramp-up” to accomplish the unforecasted large-scale requirements.  
The methods or techniques of airborne must be tailored to existing challenges; 
warfare itself has followed these very same maxims. While the roles of modern airborne 
forces has changed very little, the scale and utility in which it is used requires an update 
in organizational mindset, small and many over large and few.  
A byproduct of military reorganization efforts evokes new visions of fighting 
doctrine. The swarming concept may hold great utility for an airborne force. Instant 
communications, mobility, and flexibility from small maneuver units allow for effective 
swarming to occur. Arguably, the age of technology will have arrived when a parachute 
capable force armed with modern equipment has the necessary components to fulfill a 
swarming concept. Using Arquilla and Ronfeldt’s design elements for a swarming force, 
a reorganized airborne force operating under this concept can increase the relevancy of 
airborne forces in future conflict scenarios. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
The primary purpose of airborne forces remains largely unchanged; infiltrating 
personnel and equipment utilizing a parachute capability. However, military organization, 
doctrine, technology, and strategy under the purview of the rapidly changing and 
complex contemporary operating environment suggests rethinking the future organization 
of airborne forces and the application of new employment concepts. As a series of 
airborne specific vignettes were considered, modern airborne concepts continue to remain 
relevant, as evidenced by their utility across a spectrum of small and large-scale 
employment. Small airborne forces fulfill the roles of reconnaissance, raids, and special 
warfare; large airborne forces are aptly suited for seizure, show of force, and 
reinforcement. Categorizing the taxonomy of airborne roles into small and large-scale 
appropriately links airborne roles to the modern contemporary operating environment and 
more closely aligns the SOF with small and conventional with large, which considers that 
these roles are not exclusive to each.  
This thesis took a very holistic approach to considering the future possibilities of 
airborne employment. The value of this research is the ability to connect themes with 
practice across airborne organization, doctrine, technology, and strategy. Throughout the 
analysis, several themes occurred in considering future airborne employment.  
First, the contemporary operating environment suggests that small wars and 
conflicts occurring in hybrid form are increasingly more common. The small-scale, SOF 
airborne roles display greater relevancy in this trend for their speed, precision, and stealth 
capabilities. Yet, the expansion and proliferation of A2AD systems offer renewed 
possibilities for conventional, large-scale airborne employment. Recognizing that the 
large-scale airborne roles are much less likely to occur, an increased investment in small-
scale airborne capability is recommended.  
Second, the “small and many” over “large and few” concept proposed by Libicki, 
and echoed by many others, urges military thinkers to form new concepts of organizing 
to stay on pace with the changing technological trends. This research displays the linkage 
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between technology and force structures, and delineates the broad/narrow technology 
frames of reference to provide context to the reader on the broader implications of 
technology trends and the specific changes occurring within airborne technology. For 
airborne concepts, it means greater mobility is granted to smaller formations and larger 
formations are imperiled. Airborne concepts should seek new ways of accomplishing the 
large-scale airborne roles without further compromising airborne forces to the known 
vulnerabilities, large, slow-moving transport aircraft, proliferating surface-to-air missile 
defense systems, and the lack of armored protection on landing and subsequent follow-on 
movement. Airborne forces organized into much smaller units of action can mitigate 
these advancing and expanding airborne vulnerabilities. A battalion size or less of 
airborne forces would arguably offer the most flexible response in modern employment. 
Any more forces required would likely include an air-landing element to supplement the 
parachute capability of the forces on the ground. Additionally, further developments in 
small-scale airborne technologies—such as advanced parachute systems, transport 
aircraft, navigation aids, and stealth enhancements—will contribute to the “small and 
many” school of thought.  
Third, new doctrinal concepts, such as swarming, closely consider the changing 
technology trends, and offer new ways of optimizing the airborne force for future 
employment. Airborne forces are uniquely well-suited to operate under a swarming 
concept. Swarming characteristics incorporate autonomous, integrated, coordinated, and 
dispersed small-units designed to operate in stand-off or close-in distances while 
sustainably pulsing with force or fire. Despite the proposed benefits of restructuring an 
airborne force around such doctrine, several factors inhibit any immediate change. 
Allowing small units of action complete autonomy ranks among the highest of these 
factors. For this to change of occur, the DOD needs to accept the likelihood of increased 
risk to mission and to force, especially in an increasingly complex and uncertain threat 
environment. Risk aversion largely derives from a traditionalist mindset and a vision to 
continue fighting the “American Way of War.” 120 Rothstein cites the United States in El 
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Salvador in the early 1980s, and the Philippines post-9/11 as examples where the concept 
of “less is more” prevailed and agreeing to greater degrees of risk was accepted. Both 
outcomes display marked success by using small autonomous units of action to achieve 
desired objectives. Additionally, Mulhern’s research reveals that autonomy among 
military units is difficult to achieve without a higher degree of risk tolerance.121 Analysis 
in this area of research indicates that risk aversion is induced by exogenous political 
factors, organizational considerations, and organizational culture.122 Recognizing these 
implications to units restructured into smaller, autonomous units of action, the DOD 
consideration for the swarming concept for airborne forces will continue to remain 
stagnated as these issues persist.  
With these themes in mind for the future of airborne concepts, the SOF serves as 
an excellent test bed to integrate the “small and many” approach to airborne employment. 
Airborne reorganization under a “small and many” structure, combined with an 
implementation of a swarming concept, offer renewed relevancy to an infiltration 
technique that has seemed to have lost some modern utility. Further attention and detail is 
required to organize airborne forces optimally for small- and large-scale airborne utility 
under new employment concepts, and to turn new airborne employment visions into 
working concepts and practical application. Regardless of any change to airborne 
structures, airborne maintains a lasting impact that pervades numerous modern military 
capabilities. If given the right amount of attention, even now, airborne has excellent 
potential well into the next era of conflict.  
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